“We are investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD. Contracts have been paused,” K3 Capital said on Wednesday 18 November 2026.
The pause, posted at 13:08 GMT (London), came after the security firm Blockaid said an exploit on Ethereum had drained about $3.43 million from the vault. Liquity later said sBOLD is “a vault built and run independently by @k3_capital,” and that Liquity V2 “is NOT affected.” K3 has not confirmed Blockaid’s figure or its account of how the attack worked, and neither project had published a post-mortem when this article was written.
In brief
- K3 Capital has paused its sBOLD vault while it investigates what it calls malicious activity. Liquity says the vault is run independently of Liquity V2, which it says is unaffected, and has told users to stop depositing into the vault until further notice.
- Depositors in that independent vault, rather than users of Liquity’s core protocol, are the ones waiting for a formal account. Blockaid’s estimate of about $3.43 million is a security firm’s figure, not an official loss total.
- K3 has not confirmed the amount or the method, and no post-mortem is out yet.
We are investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD. Contracts have been paused.
— K3 Capital (@k3_capital) 18 November 2026
Liquity says sBOLD is K3’s vault, not the protocol
Liquity’s statement, posted at 13:59 GMT (London) and quoting K3’s alert, is the clearest official line on what was hit. The protocol team described sBOLD as a vault built and run independently by K3 Capital, told users to stop depositing into the vault until further notice, and said it was supporting K3 and would share updates. The distinction matters: a yield vault that sits on top of a protocol can be paused or drained while the protocol itself continues to operate.
We’re aware of malicious activity affecting sBOLD, a vault built and run independently by @k3_capital. Do not deposit into sBOLD until further notice. Liquity V2 is NOT affected. We’re supporting K3 and will share updates.
— Liquity (@LiquityProtocol) 18 November 2026
That is a familiar pattern in DeFi this autumn. When Troves said a retired contract had let an attacker drain 8.6 BTC from a vault, the live issue was also a specific vault, not every product in the same stack. K3’s wording is narrower still: it confirmed an investigation and a pause, and stopped there. Anyone who deposited into the vault is waiting on K3, not on a protocol-wide halt.
Blockaid puts the sBOLD drain at about $3.43 million
Blockaid, posting at 12:50 GMT (London) under the handle @blockaid_, said it had “detected an ongoing exploit on @k3_capital sBOLD on ethereum.” In the firm’s words, attackers “flash-loaned wstETH, self-liquidated a Liquity V2 trove into the stability pools, minted cheap sBOLD shares, swapped the collateral, and redeemed other depositors’ BOLD.” A trove, in Liquity’s terminology, is a collateralised loan position. The same post put the drain at “~$3.43M” from the sBOLD vault “so far across ~34 txs.”
Those numbers and that sequence belong to Blockaid. K3 has not confirmed either. An earlier edit of the same Blockaid post put the figure at about $300,000 and still described the attack as ongoing. The live text TSN verified later the same afternoon still used “ongoing exploit” and “so far,” so the $3.43 million figure should be read as the firm’s latest public estimate, not a closed official total.
TSN has treated Blockaid’s running tallies the same way before. In October, the firm’s $4.85 million figure for the X100 governance exploit was reported as Blockaid’s, because the project had not signed off on the number. The same discipline applies here. Until K3 publishes its own accounting, the only official facts are the investigation and the paused contracts.
A paused wrapper leaves the underlying protocol looking intact
The most useful fact in Wednesday’s statements is also the easiest to misread. Liquity’s insistence that Liquity V2 is unaffected is a claim about the core protocol, not a claim that sBOLD depositors are whole. If Blockaid’s description is right, the attack path ran through a Liquity V2 trove and the protocol’s stability pools, then out through the vault’s share minting and redemptions. That would make the vault the place where other depositors’ BOLD was taken, even if Liquity V2 itself kept running. It would also be a reminder that a yield wrapper can introduce its own economic logic — cheap share minting after a shock to the underlying pools — on top of a protocol that its operators still regard as sound.
None of that is settled. K3 has not adopted Blockaid’s mechanism, and a pause is a containment step, not a finding. The gap is the same one that appeared when Kava said about 53.9 million KAVA had been taken from HARD Lend: the useful number arrived only when the project itself published it. Here the project has published a pause and nothing else. Depositors should treat third-party estimates as provisional, and should treat Liquity’s “not affected” line as a boundary around the protocol, not as a recovery statement for the vault.
For readers who follow this file through an AML or market-integrity lens, the immediate questions are ordinary ones. Who lost funds, in what instrument, and on whose books will the loss sit? A flash-loan and self-liquidation path, if confirmed, would be an economic exploit of vault logic rather than a stolen admin key, but the effect for depositors is still a loss of assets they thought were in a pool. Those questions need K3’s post-mortem, on-chain accounting, and any recovery plan, none of which were public at hand-off.
The next thing that would change the picture is a formal account from K3: a confirmed loss figure, a description of the bug or the economic path, and a word on whether paused contracts will be resumed, wound down or replaced. Liquity has said it will share updates. Until then, the $3.43 million figure remains Blockaid’s, and depositors in the vault have only the pause itself to go on.
How we sourced this
The K3 Capital, Liquity and Blockaid posts were verified through the X API on 18 November 2026. Direct quotes follow the live text of those posts. Blockaid’s post has an edit history; one earlier version put the drain at about $300,000. K3 had not, at the time of writing, confirmed the amount, the method, or a final transaction count, and no project post-mortem was available.
Sources
- K3 Capital, X post, 18 November 2026, 13:08 GMT
- Liquity, X post, 18 November 2026, 13:59 GMT
- Blockaid, X post, 18 November 2026, 12:50 GMT
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Troves Says Retired Contract Let Attacker Drain 8.6 BTC From Vault is the closest earlier TSN neighbour: another DeFi vault, a drain attributed in public, and a project left to account for a specific contract rather than a whole protocol.
- Kava Says About 53.9 Million KAVA Was Taken From HARD Lend shows the difference a project’s own loss figure makes, once it is published.
- Ongoing X100 Exploit Has Realised $4.85m in USDT, Blockaid Says is the earlier case in which TSN treated a Blockaid running total as the firm’s estimate, not an official close.
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