HomeCrypto NewsCrypto Hacks & CrimeFusionist Urges Users to Pause ACE on BSC After a Bridge-Minter Exploit

Fusionist Urges Users to Pause ACE on BSC After a Bridge-Minter Exploit

Fusionist is investigating an apparent ongoing exploit involving ACE on BSC and has asked users to pause transfers, trades and bridging of the token on BNB Smart Chain. In a post on X at 19:30 GMT on 22 November 2026, the project wrote: “We’re investigating an apparent ongoing exploit involving ACE on BSC. Please pause ACE transfers, trades, and bridging on BSC until further notice. We’ll share confirmed updates here as soon as we have them.”

What Blockaid says happened

Twenty-two minutes earlier, at 19:08 GMT, the security firm Blockaid said it had detected an ongoing exploit on Fusionist on BSC. Its account of the mechanism is more specific than Fusionist’s first alert: “A privileged token-bridge minter minted unbacked ACE and sold it for USDT. ~$1.04M extracted in USDT so far across dozens of txs. Attack still ongoing.”

That figure should be read as a running estimate. Blockaid’s wording is “so far,” and the same post says the attack was still under way. It is not a final loss total, and Fusionist has not adopted or replaced it with a number of its own.

In a follow-up post a minute later, Blockaid published exploiter addresses, an example transaction, and the contracts it identifies as the affected token and bridge. Those are Blockaid’s identifications, offered while the incident was still unfolding. They are useful pointers for on-chain observers, not a completed post-mortem.

The pattern Blockaid describes is a familiar and ugly one in cross-chain design. If a privileged minter can create ACE on BSC without a matching lock or burn on the other side of the bridge, the new tokens are unbacked. Selling them for USDT then extracts value from whoever is on the other side of those trades, typically liquidity on a decentralised exchange, while leaving a larger circulating supply of ACE than the reserves can support. Dozens of transactions, rather than a single swap, would also be consistent with an attacker working through available liquidity rather than one instant drain.

What Fusionist has not yet said

Fusionist’s alert confirms an investigation and asks users to stop moving ACE on BSC. It does not confirm Blockaid’s mechanism, adopt the $1.04 million running estimate, or say whether the privileged minter was compromised, misused, or reached by some other route. The project has not said how the minter rights were obtained, has not given a total loss, and has not said whether there will be any compensation.

Those omissions are not a reason to ignore the warning. They are a reason not to fill the gaps with unverified tallies. Until Fusionist publishes confirmed updates, the public record is an official request to pause activity, plus a security firm’s still-moving estimate of what has already been extracted.

The geography of the incident is the chain, not a stated company office. Fusionist has not officially named a headquarters in the materials used for this file, and the exploit is described as unfolding on BNB Smart Chain.

What holders of ACE on BSC should do

The practical advice is the one Fusionist has already given. Pause ACE transfers, trades and bridging on BSC until the project says otherwise. That includes sending ACE to a bridge, swapping it on a BSC venue, or moving it between wallets “just in case.” If the minter is still able to create unbacked tokens, further trading on BSC can leave ordinary holders selling into a book that is still being pressured.

It is also a moment to be wary of copycat phishing. Messages advertising a refund, a “rescue” contract, or a new official bridge often follow a public exploit alert. Fusionist said it will share confirmed updates on the same account; that is a better place to watch than a link in an unexpected direct message.

The comparison with other recent bridge incidents is close, but not identical. Cyber last week paused its CYBER bridge after unexpected minting on Solana. zkLink Nova’s bridge was described as a drain of locked funds. The ACE on BSC case, as Blockaid currently tells it, is a privileged minter creating new tokens and selling them, which attacks liquidity and supply rather than a single locked vault. Chainflip’s recent Ethereum vault drain is a reminder that even a detailed on-chain trace can still leave the first public figure short of a finished loss total.

For now, the only confirmed instruction from the project is to stop moving ACE on BSC. Blockaid’s about $1.04 million in USDT remains a “so far” figure from an attack it said was still ongoing at 19:08 GMT. Anyone holding or trading the token should treat that as an active incident, not a closed one, until Fusionist’s promised updates arrive.

Sources

Related stories

Follow @tsnmediahub on X for breaking AI news as it happens.

Follow on X

Share this story

Latest stories

  1. Bitquery Traces a $4.86M Chainflip Vault Drain
    Crypto Hacks & Crime

More in this category

Latest stories

  1. Bitquery Traces a $4.86M Chainflip Vault Drain
    Crypto Hacks & Crime

Explore the TSN Atlas: Every topic we cover, mapped. Click a bubble to dive in.