CONFIRMED: This is based on a press release from Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) of 12 October 2026 and the guideline it published.
Germany has published a national guideline for moving to encryption that can withstand future quantum computers. High-risk systems should switch by the end of 2030 at the latest, and the whole changeover should be largely done by 2035 [1][2].
The guideline comes jointly from the Federal Interior Ministry (BMI), the Federal Ministry for Digital Affairs and State Modernisation (BMDS) and the BSI. It puts into practice a roadmap agreed by EU member states [1].
Who it is for and the deadlines
The guideline is aimed at federal, state and local government, and at organisations and companies, including operators of critical infrastructure [1].
It confirms the EU timetable [1][2]:
- High-risk uses: switch to quantum-safe methods “as early as possible”, with migration finished “by the end of 2030 at the latest” (TSN translation).
- Everything else: the whole changeover “should be largely complete by 2035” (TSN translation).
The guideline document adds that the first preparation and planning phase should be finished by the end of 2026 [2].
What organisations are asked to do
The recommended steps include [1][2]:
- clear responsibilities and binding deadlines for the switch;
- treating post-quantum cryptography as the “state of the art”;
- assessing quantum risk systematically and building it into risk management;
- bringing in suppliers and supply chains early.
The BSI also stresses “crypto-agility”: designing systems, purchasing and risk management so that encryption methods, or settings such as key lengths, can be swapped quickly and in a controlled way when new findings or threats emerge [1].
It links this to artificial intelligence. “AI is increasing the pace of security research and is also increasingly accelerating methods for attacks on cryptographic schemes,” the BSI says (TSN translation) [1].
Background: why quantum computers matter for encryption
Much of today’s online security, from banking to messaging, relies on maths problems that ordinary computers cannot solve in any useful time. A powerful enough quantum computer could solve some of them, breaking widely used encryption.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) means new encryption methods designed to resist quantum computers while still running on today’s machines.
The urgency comes partly from a tactic often called “harvest now, decrypt later”: attackers copy encrypted data today and store it until a quantum computer can unlock it. The German guideline calls this “store now, decrypt later” and says it is a realistic threat for data that must stay secret for a long time, such as classified material, sensitive personal data and trade secrets [2]. It also warns that big systems and long-lived devices take years to change, so starting late is a risk in itself [2].
Sources
- BSI, “Umstellung auf Post-Quanten-Kryptografie: Leitlinie zur nationalen Umsetzung der EU-Roadmap veröffentlicht”, Bonn, 12 October 2026 (via PUBT, unedited). https://pubt.io/view/B5DF71D5CEE973521A8AD65B37882C78480E9076 ; BSI press page: https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/pressemitteilungen_node.html
- BMDS, BMI and BSI, “Nationale Umsetzung der EU-Roadmap zur Umstellung auf Post-Quanten-Kryptografie” (guideline, PDF). https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Krypto/Leitlinie-Umstellung-PQC.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
