Lattice Semiconductor has released version 5.0 of Lattice Sentry, a package of chips, software and tools that protects the low-level firmware inside servers and signs it with post-quantum cryptography. In a press release issued on 12 October 2026 at 4pm US Eastern time (21:00 BST), Lattice called it “the industry’s first” post-quantum platform firmware resilience and attestation solution [1]. That is Lattice’s own claim; TSN has not seen an independent check of it.
Lattice says the stack offers “CNSA 2.0-aligned, NIST-compliant protection” for AI data centres and critical infrastructure [1]. It is on show this week at the OCP Global Summit in San Jose, which runs from 13 to 15 October [1].
What platform firmware resilience means
Every server runs small programs before the main operating system starts. The BIOS (or UEFI) wakes the hardware and starts the boot. The BMC, or baseboard management controller, is a separate little computer on the board that lets operators switch the machine on and off, update it and watch it remotely. Network cards, storage and other parts carry firmware of their own.
If an attacker replaces this firmware with a tampered version, they can control the machine below the level where antivirus and operating-system security can see them, and the change can survive a full reinstall. That is why Lattice’s Mamta Gupta says in the release that “platform firmware has become a primary attack vector” [1].
Platform firmware resilience is the defence. A small, trusted chip, called a root of trust, starts first and checks that the BIOS, BMC and other firmware carry a valid digital signature before they are allowed to run. A US standard, NIST SP 800-193, sets out three jobs for this: protect the firmware from unauthorised changes, detect when it has been tampered with, and recover to a known good copy. Lattice says Sentry does all three for BIOS, BMC and other board firmware, including automatic recovery [1][2]. In Sentry, the root of trust is a Lattice FPGA, a chip whose logic can be programmed after it is made.
What is in Sentry 5.0
According to Lattice [1][2], the new version includes:
- Post-quantum signatures and keys. ML-DSA, LMS and XMSS for checking that firmware and devices are genuine, and ML-KEM for setting up shared encryption keys. These are algorithms standardised by NIST that are designed to resist future quantum computers.
- Firmware protection. SP 800-193 protection, detection and recovery for BIOS, BMC and other board firmware, with protection against rolling firmware back to older, weaker versions.
- Attestation. Devices can prove what firmware they are running using SPDM, an industry protocol for this, across servers and racks.
- Device identity. DICE, a method for giving each chip a cryptographic identity tied to the code it booted, to help catch supply-chain tampering.
- Rack-wide checks. Multi-device attestation for “disaggregated” racks, where processors, memory, storage and accelerators sit in separate units rather than one box.
The stack pairs Lattice’s FPGAs with AMI’s Tektagon PQC Resiliency software. Lattice’s blog says Tektagon runs on Lattice silicon and handles post-quantum key provisioning, attestation, firmware updates and lifecycle management [2]. Lattice says demo boards and custom design services are available now [1]. It did not name customers or give prices.
Gupta, Lattice’s vice president of business development for compute and communications, said “the quantum era will upend decades of security assumptions,” and added: “Customers no longer have to choose between security today and quantum readiness” [1].
Why firmware keys need quantum protection first
Today’s firmware is mostly signed with algorithms such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. A large enough quantum computer could break these and work out the private signing key from the public one. Anyone holding that key could produce forged firmware that a server would accept as genuine.
Firmware is a special problem because hardware lasts a long time. The code that checks signatures often sits in the chip itself and cannot easily be changed. The US National Security Agency (NSA) makes this point in its CNSA 2.0 guidance: firmware-signing algorithms are “frequently locked in for the life of a system,” so a quantum-resistant root of trust “may be required in the firmware years before the rest of the system” upgrades [3]. A server bought today may still be in a rack well into the 2030s. If the chip can only check old-style signatures, it cannot be fixed later by a software update.
What CNSA 2.0 requires
CNSA 2.0 is the NSA’s list of approved algorithms for US national security systems. It also sets deadlines that many commercial suppliers follow. According to the NSA [3][4]:
- For firmware and software signing, it approves the hash-based schemes LMS and XMSS, and recommends LMS with SHA-256/192. ML-DSA-87 is approved for signatures in any use, firmware included.
- For key exchange, it uses ML-KEM-1024.
- For timing, firmware and software signing should “begin transitioning immediately”, support and prefer CNSA 2.0 by 2025, and use it exclusively by 2030. From 1 January 2027, CNSA 2.0 algorithms are required in all new acquisitions for national security systems. The NSA expects the whole move to quantum-resistant algorithms to be finished by 2035.
Sentry’s mix of algorithms matches this list. Lattice describes the stack as “CNSA 2.0-aligned” [1]. The release does not mention any formal government certification.
What this means
- “Industry-first” is Lattice’s own label. The features are real and listed in detail, but no outside body has confirmed the “first” claim.
- Firmware is where post-quantum deadlines hit first. NSA guidance puts firmware signing ahead of most other uses, and Sentry is aimed at that window.
- The target is AI racks. Attestation across disaggregated racks reflects how AI data centres are now built: many separate devices that each need to prove they are trustworthy.
Sources
- Lattice Semiconductor, “Lattice Delivers Industry-First PQC-Enabled Platform Firmware Resilience for AI Infrastructure with Lattice Sentry Solution Stack”, press release via MarketScreener, 12 October 2026. https://www.marketscreener.com/news/lattice-delivers-industry-first-pqc-enabled-platform-firmware-resilience-for-ai-infrastructure-with-ce785dddd881f627
- Lattice Semiconductor blog, “Closing the Firmware PQC Security Gap in AI Infrastructure”, 2026. https://www.latticesemi.com/en/Blog/2026/Closing-the-Firmware-PQC-Security-Gap-in-AI-Infrastructure
- NSA, “The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ”, Ver. 2.2, October 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF
- NSA, CNSA 2.0 guidance (media.defense.gov). https://media.defense.gov/2025/May/30/2003728741/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS.PDF
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