HomeTech NewsQuantumNEC and IBM Japan Demonstrate Hybrid QKD and Post-Quantum TLS

NEC and IBM Japan Demonstrate Hybrid QKD and Post-Quantum TLS

NEC and IBM Japan say they have “successfully completed Japan’s first demonstration of a hybrid quantum-safe communication technology combining quantum key distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC).” The joint announcement is dated 17 November 2026 and is also carried on IBM Japan’s newsroom. “Japan’s first” is the companies’ claim.

The work was a validation test, not a live network deployment. The companies say the demonstration ran from July to September 2026. The releases do not give performance figures.

According to NEC, its QKD equipment was connected “through a REST-based key delivery API based on ETSI GS QKD 014” to a proxy-based validation environment that used a custom-built version of IBM Quantum Safe Proxy, formerly IBM Quantum Safe Remediator, “including ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-44 and HKDF-SHA256.” Interoperability, the companies said, was successfully verified.

For TLS key establishment, NEC said, “secret material obtained through QKD and secret material established through ML-KEM-768 were cryptographically combined using HKDF-SHA256 to derive the traffic-protection secret.” QKD was therefore used together with, rather than as an alternative to, PQC. “Peer authentication remained certificate-based and used ML-DSA-44 signatures.” The IBM Japan release describes the same arrangement.

NEC’s release also sets out a broader design aim. PQC, it says, can be introduced without extensive changes to existing systems, while QKD distributes cryptographic keys over optical-fibre links. By integrating both within a key-management infrastructure, the companies say, the range of available key-establishment methods can be widened, including the use of a PQC-based method when QKD is unavailable. That is their account of the architecture they have in mind, not a result from this test, which they say did not evaluate QKD as an independent fallback channel.

The companies also say the test was designed to leave existing software alone. NEC wrote that, “by adding a proxy layer without modifying existing applications, the demonstration confirmed that migration to a quantum-resistant communications environment combining QKD and PQC can be achieved without significant modifications to existing applications and communication systems.”

The same release is explicit about what was not tested. The validation, it said, “demonstrated technical interoperability and combined key establishment; it did not evaluate QKD as a replacement for certificate-based authentication or as an independent fallback channel.”

What the companies want to try next, and how it sits beside other quantum-safe work

NEC and IBM Japan say they will now “explore practical deployment opportunities in areas requiring long-term confidentiality, including core banking and transaction systems, as well as communications between financial institutions and data centers.” That is a statement of intent, not a contract or a go-live date.

The demonstration sits in a field TSN has already been covering as governments and vendors plan a shift to post-quantum algorithms. ACSC, CISA and NSA have updated their post-quantum questions for vendors, and NIST has finalised a post-quantum transition plan that would deprecate RSA and ECDSA after 2030. Those posts are about migration planning and standards. A neighbouring standard on the QKD side is ITU’s X.1711 recommendation for QKD protocols, which is not this test and should not be read as an official endorsement of the NEC and IBM Japan setup.

NEC notes that NIST standardised PQC algorithms in 2024, including two to which IBM contributed, and that a US executive order in June 2026 set a 2030 migration deadline for federal agencies. Those are background facts in the companies’ own account of why they ran the demonstration.

A validation demo is not a live quantum-safe network

The firm facts are narrow. NEC and IBM Japan have announced a joint validation, run from July to September 2026, in which NEC QKD equipment was connected over an ETSI GS QKD 014 key-delivery API to a customised IBM Quantum Safe Proxy, ML-KEM-768 and QKD secrets were combined with HKDF-SHA256 to protect TLS traffic, and authentication stayed certificate-based with ML-DSA-44. The companies present this as Japan’s first demonstration of that hybrid method. They also say the proxy was placed in front of existing applications, and that the test did not evaluate QKD as a substitute for certificate-based authentication or as a standalone fallback path.

That last limitation matters. A reader could take “hybrid quantum-safe communication” to mean that QKD can stand in if certificates fail, or that the system was shown to keep working when one path is cut. The companies say they did not test those things. They also publish no throughput, latency or key-rate figures, so there is no basis here for saying the method is fast enough, or cheap enough, for the banking and data-centre links they hope to pursue next.

“Japan’s first” should be kept in the companies’ voice. It is a claim about novelty, not a finding independently checked in this report. The same is true of the future-looking language about core banking systems. Until a later announcement describes a production deployment, or an independent evaluation, the news is that a laboratory-style interoperability test has been completed, not that a quantum-safe financial network has been switched on.

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