The Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority have put out a joint consultation on how financial-services firms should manage cyber risk and recover from incidents, the Bank of England said on 19 November 2026. The FCA, in a press release the same day, said the proposed cyber resilience guidance aligns with recognised frameworks, including the National Cyber Security Centre’s Cyber Assessment Framework, and “sets out how firms should manage their cyber risk and resilience without imposing rigid rules.” The package is a proposal only. Comments close on 26 February 2027, and the regulators say feedback will inform final guidance next year.
In brief
- The Bank of England, PRA and FCA are consulting jointly on cyber risk and resilience management, issued as PRA CP17/26 and FCA GC26/9, for firms already in scope of existing operational resilience requirements.
- The text is proposed guidance rather than a new rulebook. It covers how firms govern, identify, protect against, detect, respond to and recover from cyber risks and incidents.
- Separate “effective practices” on AI-linked cyber risk and on quantum computing sit outside the formal consultation. The FCA says October 2026 saw the second-highest monthly number of cyber incidents reported to it in five years.
The proposed cyber resilience guidance gathers existing expectations
The consultation paper, titled CP17/26 and GC26/9 – Cyber risk and resilience management, and the FCA’s matching guidance consultation GC26/9, bring together existing requirements and lessons from supervisory experience. Both the Bank and the FCA say the aim is to give firms greater clarity about what is expected of them, with flexibility in how those expectations are met in a fast-evolving threat environment.
The proposed guidance covers five familiar pillars. Firms would be expected to embed cyber risk and resilience in governance and risk management, with clear roles, board and senior-management oversight, a defined risk appetite, and regular reporting and assurance. They would need up-to-date inventories and maps of critical assets, systems, data and dependencies, and an assessment of relevant threats, vulnerabilities and potential impacts. Proportionate protective controls would include secure configuration, vulnerability and patch management, identity and access management, data protection, and controls over third parties and supply chains. Detection would rest on monitoring, defined alerting and escalation, and regular testing of a firm’s ability to identify potential attacks. Response and recovery would require tested plans, clear decision-making and communications, the ability to contain attacks and restore services, and a process for lessons learned.
The Bank of England’s latest Systemic Risk Survey, the releases say, cited cyber as one of the risks that would have the greatest impact on the UK financial system. The FCA’s incident figures are starker still. “October 2026 saw the second-highest monthly number of cyber incidents reported to the FCA in 5 years, and the highest in the past 18 months, 52% above the previous high recorded in May 2025,” the FCA said.
Nikhil Rathi, chief executive of the FCA, said: “Technology moves fast, and so do cyber threats. The financial sector has a crucial role in tackling those threats, including through products like cyber insurance.” He added: “Our response shouldn’t always be more rules. Firms have asked us for clarity about what good cyber resilience looks like. This guidance provides it, helping strengthen their resilience, protect clients and the services they rely on.”
Katharine Braddick, chief executive of the PRA and deputy governor at the Bank of England, said: “Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, complex and dangerous. Regulators need confidence both that firms have strong cyber controls and that they can detect, contain and recover quickly from incidents. Today’s proposed guidance builds on latest understanding to help firms do that.”
Dr Richard Horne, chief executive of the NCSC, said the centre “welcomes this proposed guidance, which will help firms better understand, assess, and strengthen their cyber resilience, in line with our Cyber Assessment Framework.”
AI and quantum papers sit beside the consultation, not inside it
Separately, the regulators have published additional “effective practices” intended to help firms prepare for cyber risks linked to rapid developments in AI and to the potential emergence of quantum computing. Those papers include firms tackling vulnerabilities to threat actors using AI, and they encourage firms to consider the implications of quantum computing, “which could undermine the public-key cryptography that underpins financial transactions.”
The additional material on AI and quantum computing “is not open for formal consultation.” The regulators say they are nonetheless keen to hear whether this type of support is useful and what industry would like to see in future. A recent Bank of England and FCA survey found that 88% of respondents expect frontier AI cyber capabilities to have a moderate or high impact on their risk profile over the next two years, and that 64% said vulnerability management and patching had seen the greatest increase in management attention because of awareness of frontier AI.
That quantum point sits in the same neighbourhood as NEC and IBM Japan’s recent demonstration of hybrid quantum-key distribution and post-quantum TLS, which was a lab and field trial of migration techniques rather than a UK supervisory expectation. Firms already have a more immediate UK hook in HM Treasury’s designation of five further critical third parties, which tightens oversight of the suppliers on which operational resilience now depends. The FCA has also previously set out how incident reporting should treat AI failures and near-misses, a narrower conduct question than the joint cyber resilience guidance now out for comment.
A consultation window is not a finished rulebook
The political temptation will be to read a joint Bank, PRA and FCA announcement, plus a sharp rise in reported incidents, as the start of a new cyber rulebook for UK finance. The documents themselves point the other way. The regulators have chosen guidance, aligned with the NCSC framework, and have said in terms that they are not imposing rigid rules. Rathi’s line that the response should not always be more rules is the policy choice being tested, not a side remark. Until the consultation closes on 26 February 2027 and final guidance is issued next year, nothing in this package of cyber resilience guidance changes the binding requirements already in force.
The scope is also narrower than a first reading of the press notices might suggest. The proposed guidance applies to firms already in scope of the regulators’ existing operational resilience requirements. It is a restatement and clarification for that population, not a fresh perimeter. Boards and senior managers at those firms will still have to decide how far to treat the five pillars as a checklist and how far as a statement of outcomes they already claim to meet.
The AI and quantum papers deserve a colder reading still. They are useful signals of where supervisors are looking, and the survey figures on frontier AI and patching give that concern some texture. They are not, however, part of the formal consultation. A firm that spends the winter commenting only on CP17/26 and GC26/9 will not, through that process, be amending the effective-practices documents. Those papers can still inform internal planning, especially on public-key cryptography, but they should be filed as supervisory colour rather than as text that will be finalised on the same timetable as the cyber resilience guidance. Firms that want a single reading list should keep the cyber resilience guidance consultation and the two effective-practices papers in separate folders.
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- FCA Says Incident Reporting Must Cover AI Failures and Near-Misses
- HM Treasury Designates Five More Critical Third Parties
- NEC and IBM Japan Demonstrate Hybrid QKD and Post-Quantum TLS
Sources
- Bank of England, Cyber resilience guidance consultation and AI and quantum effective practices, 19 November 2026
- Financial Conduct Authority, UK financial watchdogs clarify cyber expectations as attacks rise, 19 November 2026
- Bank of England, CP17/26 and GC26/9 – Cyber risk and resilience management
- Financial Conduct Authority, GC26/9: Cyber risk and resilience management
- Effective practices: cyber risk and resilience management relating to artificial intelligence
- Effective practices: cyber risk and resilience management relating to quantum computing
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